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THE SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
RULES AND RULERS
MARK W. JANIS*
The recent developments in the law of the sea form only one
chapter of a larger story which deals with the development of in-
ternational law in general. This larger story has to do with the
ways in which the rules of international law are perceived and how
it is believed the world should be governed. This Article examines
the tale of the law of the sea in the 1970's and 1980's in an histori-
cal perspective. It is especially important for Americans to remem-
ber the record of history. This is so not only because the United
States is one of the most powerful states in the world and, hence,
has a great influence on how the present chapter on the law of the
sea is written, but also because the United States has a disquieting
record of great accomplishment and of great failure in interna-
tional law and organization.
International lawyers usually acknowledge the Dutchman
Hugo de Groot-Grotius, in Latin-as the father of international
law. It was his book, The Laws of War and Peace,' published in
1625, which was largely responsible for the modern development of
this field of jurisprudence. Grotius' object in writing this book was
to persuade his reading audience that the nation-states were
obliged to obey some form of universal law.2 This was a difficult
proposition. In 1625, Europe was in the midst of what is now called
the Thirty Years War3 -a struggle that devastated Central Europe.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut, School of Law, A.B., Princeton Univer-
sity, 1969; B.A., Oxford University, 1972; M.A., Oxford University, 1975; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1977.
1 H. GROTIUS, THE LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE (1625).
2 See E. DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF HUGO GRoTrus 58, 61 (1969); C.
EDWARDS, HUGO GROTIUS: THE MIRACLE OF HOLLAND 96 (1981); Pollock, The Sources of
International Law, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 511, 518 (1902).
' See J. POLISENsKY, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 259 (1971); C. STOCKTON, OUTLINES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1914). The Thirty Years War resulted from a combination of reli-
gious intolerance and political aggrandizement that divided the princes of Central Europe
into warring factions that were distinguishable as either Catholic or Protestant. See G.
PAGES, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 1618-1648, at 40 (1970); H. WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 69 (1973). The effects of the war on human life were
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In the 17th century, the political and legal authority of the Catho-
lic Church was on the wane,4 and the medieval feudal order of Eu-
rope and the Emperor already had deteriorated.5 In place of the
Pope and feudalism there emerged a new system of political au-
thority, based on nation-states such as England, France, and Swe-
den.6 The Thirty Years War drew to a close in 1648, with the sign-
ing of two treaties, commonly referred to as the Peace of
Westphalia.7 That date, 1648, and these two treaties, are used to-
day to mark the beginnings of modern international relations and
modern international law, a period chiefly characterized by the
concentration of power in nation-states." The Treaties of Westpha-
lia confirmed the political and legal rights of the national sover-
eigns to rule their subjects more or less safe from outside interfer-
ence-free from the rules of the Church and the feudal order.9
But did this mean the nation-states were subject to no outside
law? Grotius argued that sovereign states are themselves ruled by
staggering; hundreds of villages were completely destroyed, many towns lost one-half of
their population, and there was a complete moral and mental degeneration in all of Ger-
many. D. OGG, EuRoPE IN TE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 164 (1960); see also S. STEINBERG, THE
THIRTY YEARS WAR 1 (1966) (Germany left "depopulated, devastated and impoverished").
4 See H. TRvoR-RoPrR, THE CRISIS oF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 40-41 (1967) (in the
17th century, the Catholic Church was firmly tied to the old feudal system and thus was no
longer politically effective).
5See M. BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 448 (1961) (feudalism declined in the 13th century
and met its final demise in the 17th and 18th centuries); J. BRYCE, THE HOLY RoMAN EM-
Prm 389-90 (1950) (by middle of 17th century, the Holy Roman Empire was "no longer an
Empire at all, but a Federation, and that of the loosest sort"); T. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCI-
PLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 20, at 23 (7th ed. 1927) (by time of Reformation the emperors
of feudalism lost their supremacy).
6 See R. DAvis, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE 368 (1957); Pages, The War as a Di-
viding Point Between Medieval and Modern Times, in THE THmTY YEARS WAR 32, 40 (T.
Rabb ed. 1972). Although the beginning of the synthesis of the nation-states generally is
attributed to the Renaissance in the 15th century, monarchies that were free from the rigid
temporal and spiritual superiority of the Pope and the Emperor had begun to form by the
13th century. See R. DAvIS, supra, at 368; R. LODGE, THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES 518
(1910).
7 See G. PAGES, supra note 3, at 227; J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 9 (4th ed. 1958). All of the major European states, with the exception of England,
participated in the 3-year treaty negotiations and signed the treaties in 1648. J. HosACK,
THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 223 (1982).
8 See J. WESTLAKE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (1904); Gross, The Peace of Westphalia,
1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 26 (1948).
" See Gross, supra note 8, at 39. The treaties of Westphalia established the right of the
leaders of the nation-states to conduct diplomatic relations, even with states outside the
Holy Roman Empire, and to make independent decisions regarding the waging of war and
the formation of alliances. H. WHEATON, supra note 3, at 69-70.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
what is now called international law.10 Grotius' law was not the law
of the Church or of feudal lords; it was, in Grotius' view, natural
law and the law that had been agreed to by the states themselves,
either in written treaties or in the form of unwritten customary
law." Grotius propounded the existence of a law that binds sover-
eigns, and'offered various examples of what he considered .actual
rules that were applicable to nation-states. 2 Thus, at a time of
great international strife, when the new nation-states were ram-
paging across a Europe that was seemingly without law and order,
Grotius offered international law as a new means of regulating
state behavior and of bringing some harmony and security to world
affairs.
Whatever its failings, the international law of Grotius proved
remarkably successful for almost three centuries. No better exam-
ple of this success is to be found than the international law of the
sea. Despite the claims of those like John Selden who called for the
seas to be carved up by the coastal states,13 arguments of interna-
tional lawyers such as Grotius won the day.1 4 The vast expanse of
the oceans was preserved as an international commons, open to the
sailing and fishing vessels of all states. 5 Although the earth's lands
were to be divided among the European colonial powers of the
18th and 19th centuries, the oceans remained open to all, an inter-
national territory where the rules of international law had primacy.
The rules of the international law of the sea were, in many
ways, indicative of the rules of international law in general. They
were international rules without an international ruler. This poses
10 See H. GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACS Lmm TRs, reprinted in 1 THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (F. Kelsey trans. 1964).
:1 See H. GROTIUS, supra note 10, at 23-24.
2 See A. NUSSEAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 106-07 (1947); F.
RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT 24-25 (1975). Grotius maintained that
the existence of the rights of conscientious objectors and neutral nations during war was a
clear example of a law of nations. A. NUSSBAUM, supra, at 106. Furthermore, while Grotius
recognized that the law of nations permitted wartime atrocities such as the murder of civil-
ians, the enslavement of prisoners of war, and the poisoning of water supplies, he argued
that such actions violate the precepts of natural law. F. RUDDY, supra, at 25.
13 See J. SELDEN, OF THE DOMINION OR, OwNERSHEP OF THE SEA 179 (1972); see 1 D.
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (2d ed. 1970); C. PHLLIPSON, WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (5th ed. 1916).
14 See A. NUSSEAUM, supra note 12, at 108; C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 13, at 299-300;
MacRae, Customary International Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty, 13
CAL. W.J. INT'L L. 181, 186 (1983).
15 See T. LAWRENCE, supra note 5, at 177, 190; H. SmrTH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE
SEA 5 (2d ed. 1950).
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an interesting theoretical problem. Given the absence of an inter-
national sovereign authority, some argue that since there is no
body either to make or to enforce international law, international
law does not exist.16 These disbelievers, often classified as legal
positivists, contend that only the nation-states can make and en-
force rules, and that the only real laws are the municipal laws en-
acted and enforced by the sovereign states themselves. 17 Some le-
gal positivists thus deny the law-like quality of international law.
Indeed, the famous legal positivist John Austin asserted there was
no international law, only an "international morality."' 8
Nonetheless, during the three centuries after Grotius, there
was in practice an effective system of international rules relating to
the seas, among other things, at a period when there was no inter-
national executive, legislature, or court. The way this worked, and
largely still does work, is that though the rules were international,
the rulers were national. National authorities provided the law-
making, law-enforcing and law-adjudicating functions.
Although there are many examples of this classical interna-
tional law, a system based on international rules but without inter-
national rulers, one case familiar to anyone who has studied inter-
national law in America well illustrates the classical system. In
1900, the United States Supreme Court decided The Paquete Ha-
bana.19 The United States Navy had seized two Cuban fishing
trawlers in Spanish territorial waters at the outset of the Spanish
American War.20 Although the Cuban crews were unaware that a
war was underway, their vessels were nevertheless brought into
Key West, Florida, condemned, and sold as prizes of war by a
United States federal district court.2 The question before the Su-
preme Court was whether the seizures were permitted under inter-
national law.
A skeptic would simply say that there was no international law
applicable in this case. Who would order the United States to give
up the proceeds from the sale of the fishing boats? What rule could
16 See, e.g., C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 13, at 15; see G. NIEMEYER, LAW WrrioUT FORCE
161 (1941); J. WESTLAKE, supra note 8, at 8.
11 See M. MlI, JuRaimcA PosrrVsM AND Humi RIGHTS 44 (1981); W. MORISON,
JOHN AusTIN 79-80 (1982); G. NiEmEYER, supra note 16, at 161.
18 See J. AusTN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 91 (abr. 12th ed. 1913).
19 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
20 Id. at 678-79. The two fishing vessels were off the coast of Cuba when they were
captured. Id.
21 Id.
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there be that a United States domestic court could use to deprive
the United States Government of its war profits? Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court pronounced: "International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice
of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depend-
ing upon it are duly presented for their determination. ' '22
The international law that the Supreme Court consulted in
The Paquete Habana was the law of the sea. The Court's decision
was based on the customary law of nation-states dating back to the
15th century, the practice of nations embodied in proclamations
and treaties, judicial decisions, and the opinions of publicists.23
This was the practice, not only of the United States, but of Eng-
land, France, Argentina, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria,
Spain, Italy, Russia and Portugal. 4 Drawing from these sources
and evidences of international law, the Supreme Court determined
that there was a rule of customary international law of the sea that
provided that "coast fishing vessels with their implements and
supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed, and honestly... bringing
in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war. ' 25 Pursuant
to this rule, the Court held that the United States Government
must pay the proceeds of the sale of the two fishing boats to their
Cuban owners and crews.26 Here, international law was used as the
rule of decision in a domestic court case that permitted foreign
persons to secure legal redress against the very Government of the
forum state.
Who made this international law? Certainly no international
legislature. The sources of the law were the states themselves, in
their customary practice, as evidenced by proclamations, treaties
and court opinions from the various countries. Who enforced this
law? Certainly no international executive. It was the executive of
each country, in this case the United States, who enforced the
rules of international law. Who adjudicated this law? Certainly no
international court. It was the domestic tribunal of one of the sov-
ereign states, in this case the United States Supreme Court, that
found and applied the rule of international law necessary to re-
solve the particular dispute.
22 Id. at 700.
22 See id. at 686-712.
24 See id. at 689-712.
21 Id. at 708.
26 Id. at 714.
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The Paquete Habana is a plain and forceful example of the
international law about which Grotius wrote and which has played
such an important part in world affairs from the end of the Thirty
Years War to the 20th Century. It was, and to a good degree still
is, a system of international rules, but without an international
ruler. Nonetheless, it often has been a system of rules that has
worked well in practice.
But no human creation, not even classical international law,
can work for all time. In the 20th century, a crisis of no less magni-
tude than the one that faced Grotius in the 17th century faces
both classical international law and the international political sys-
tem of nation-states with which classical international law is so
tightly bound. This crisis largely has been brought on by the fail-
ure of the nation-state system itself.
For almost three centuries, the nation-state system, at least in
Europe, was largely successful. Unlike the 17th century, which was
characterized by terrible wars, the 18th and 19th centuries were
times of relative peace and security.27 With the exception of the
Napoleonic wars, no great struggles involved large numbers of
Europeans. It appeared as if the nation-states could adjust their
differences, even when warring, at relatively little cost to the aver-
age citizen.
How different has been the 20th century. There have been two
disastrous confrontations between the nation-states, which were,
quite simply, stupendous failures of nation-states adequately to
protect their populations.28 Millions of people died fighting in both
World Wars.2 9 Millions more died in the Second World War as ci-
27 See Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 56 (abr. ed. 1964); see also G. CLARK, WAR AND
SOCIETY IN THE SEvENTENTH CENTURY 9 (1958) (war in the 17th century became "an institu-
tion, a regular and settled mode of action"); R. DUNN, THm AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS 1559-
1715, at 1 (2d ed. 1979) (the late 16th and the 17th century were a "tumultuous and anar-
chic" period of civil war and rebellion).
28 See Lipson, The Nation-State System, in BASIc IssuES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
138, 145 (1974) (the extent of violence in the 20th century "is a sign of some fundamental
malaise or transformation going on within society to which the existing political institutions
are not responding adequately").
29 See H. BALDWIN, WORLD WAR I, at 156 (1962) (8,600,000 soldiers died during World
War I); THE HISTOJcAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD WAR II, at 131-32 (M. Baudot ed. 1980)
(45-50 million died in World War I1 combat); L. SNYDER, HISTORICAL GumE TO WORLD WAR
H, at 125 (1982) (35-55 million died in World War H); WORLD WAR I: A CONCISE MMITARY
HISTORY OF "THE WAR TO END ALL WARS" AND THE ROAD TO WAR 113 (M. Matloff ed. 1979)
(8,500,000 died in combat in World War I).
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vilians in concentration camps and bombed cities.30
The lesson was plain. Regardless of what the rules of interna-
tional law were, it seemed as if the rulers had failed. It should be
no surprise that mankind's greatest efforts for effective interna-
tional government, the League of Nations and the United Nations,
followed these two terrible wars. In the 17th century, Grotius rea-
soned from the experience of the Thirty Years War that there
must be rules to govern rampaging nation-states., Modern man
looked at the 20th century and reasoned the same.
If there was any lingering doubt as to the adequacy of the na-
tion-state system in this day and age, the threat of global nuclear
war persuades many to question the capacity of nation-states to
serve as effective guardians of their lives, families, and societies.3 1
The strategy of the superpowers is based on the very real possibil-
ity of inflicting "unacceptable" losses on civilian populations as a
deterrent to war. 2 Unfortunately, deterrence need fail only once to
yield the end of human civilization.3 Hence, it seems to many that
there must be some form of international governance as well as
some form of international law, however difficult these proposi-
tions may be. 4
30 See R. MANVELL & H. FRAENKEL, THE INCOMPARABLE CRIME 2 (1967) (10 million ex-
terminated by Nazis); F. MILLER, HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II at v (1945) (10 million mas-
sacred by Nazis); Q. WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 60 (air raids of Dresden in 1943 and atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed 300,000 people).
31 See, e.g., J. KAHAN, SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 4-5 (1975) (questioning strategy in
the nuclear arms race); Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the
Atlantic Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 753, 754 (1982) (doubting the deterrent effect and con-
sidering the danger of the United States' policy to initiate use of nuclear weapons, if neces-
sary, to defend Europe against Soviet conventional attack).
32 See L. FREEDMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY 245, 247 (1981) (nuclear
strategy of "mutual assured destruction" based on "threat to destroy centres of popula-
tion"); Keeny & Panofsky, MAD Versus NUTS: Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy the
Mutual Hostage Relationship of the Superpowers?, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 287, 288 (1982) (super-
powers strategy of "Mutual Assured Destruction ... holds the entire populations of both
countries as hostages").
33 J. SPANIER, GAMEs NATIONS PLAY 171-72 (3d ed. 1978) (result of failed deterrence
would be extinction); see Keeny & Panofsky, supra note 32, at 288 ("portion of the nuclear
stockpile of either side could inflict on the other as many as 100 million fatalities and de-
stroy it as a functioning society"); Sakharov, The Danger of Thermonuclear War, 61 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 1001, 1002 (1983) ("large nuclear war would be a calamity of indescribable propor-
tions and absolutely unpredictable consequences, with the uncertainties tending toward the
worse").
3' See, e.g., G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 366 (1974) (necessity of a world
state advocated by "[b]ourgeois philosophers, politicians, and jurists" to maintain peace in
atomic age).
[Vol. 58:306
SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
It should be no surprise, therefore, that the 20th century has
seen such an impressive growth in international organization. No
century has been fraught with such perils, both realized and poten-
tial. Conversely, no century has been graced with such efforts to
surmount human conffict with effective international law and or-
ganization. The League of Nations and the United Nations, the
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International
Court of Justice, the World Bank and the European Economic
Community-all are creations of 20th century international law
and each is a better step toward international organization than
any institution in history. There is reason to hope that as Grotius
and the international lawyers of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries
fashioned a legal system that brought a degree of peace and secur-
ity to those times, so too are international lawyers in the 20th cen-
tury beginning the work that will bring a degree of peace and se-
curity to the present time and beyond. This work will be no easier
than it was for Grotius, but it needs to be done all the same.
The immediacy and difficulty of the task is well illustrated by
the recent developments in the law of the seas. The law of the sea,
one of the old bastions of international law, is now at a turning
point. Recent developments have in large measure boded ill. In the
20th century, especially in the last 40 years, there has been a grad-
ual erosion of much of the territory once included in the interna-
tional ocean common. First came national acquisition of the conti-
nental shelf, including the 1945 Truman Proclamation. 5 Then
there was the expansion of jurisdiction over national territorial wa-
ters from 3 to 12 miles36 and now, at least in exclusive economic
zones, to 200 miles.37 The reason for such expansions of national
31 Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. §§ 1943-1948 (1945). The trend toward expanding
national jurisdiction over the seabed began during World War II when Venezuela and Brit-
ain agreed to divide the seabed in the Gulf of Paria between Venezuela and Trinidad. See
B. BuzAN, SEABED PoLrIcs 7 (1976). On September 28, 1945, President Truman signed a
Proclamation entitled the Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Re-
sources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, which reserved jurisdiction of
the continental shelf for the purposes of "exploration and exploitation" by the United
States. E. LUARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-BED 35 (1974). This was "the first claim by a
major maritime power to jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea."
See B. BuzAN, supra, at 7. In the 5 years subsequent to the Truman Proclamation, 30 coun-
tries followed the American initiative. Id. at 8.
36 E. LUARD, supra note 35, at 31; Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inven-
tory and Prospect, 20 SAN DEGo L. REv. 561, 567 (1983).
"I Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. 57, 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LOS Convention]; Nawaz, On the Advent of the
1984]
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zones is easy to find. When Grotius debated with Selden, the
Dutchman argued that no nation could rule the seas effectively
very far from its coasts.38 Twentieth century technological achieve-
ments, however, such as radar, offshore drilling, and air and sea
patrols, make it possible for individual nation-states to rule the
seas in ways that John Selden could only dream of. Despite the
fact that Grotius won the debate, only international rules were es-
tablished for the seas, never international rulers. When it became
possible for the seas to be ruled, nation-states began to fill the gap.
Although the nation-states have carved up much of what there
was to the international commons of the oceans, and the Law of
the Sea Treaty sadly only confirms this division of territory,39 the
treaty also has developed international rules preserving certain
rights of foreign states, for example, to navigate and pass through
straits.40 These international rules applicable to the new zones of
national authority are, of course, important, but it should be
remembered that in terms of territory, at least, the modern devel-
opments in the law of the sea have left us far less international
room on the oceans than before.
Other than the international rules protecting the rights of for-
eign states in national ocean areas, the principal positive interna-
tional aspect to the Law of the Sea Treaty has been the develop-
ment of multinational institutions for regulating what remains of
the international commons, principally the deep seabed.41 Here it
Exclusive Economic Zone: Implications for a New Law of the Sea, in LAw OF THE SEA:
CARACAS AND BEYOND 180, 186-88 (R. Anand ed. 1980). The LOS Convention provides: "The
exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea." LOS Conven-
tion, supra, art. 55, at 1280. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has "sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, and conserving and managing the natural
resources ... of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil
... ." Id. art. 56, at 1280. See generally W. EXTAVOUR, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
183-90 (1979) (rights and duties of the coastal state in the exclusive economic zone).
38 See H. GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 7 (1916).
39 See MacRae, supra note 14, at 222; see also LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 3,
at 1272 (12 mile territorial sea), art. 33, at 1276 (contiguous zones), art. 55, at 1280 (exclu-
sive economic zones).
40 See, e.g., LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 17, at 1273 (right of innocent passage);
id. art. 38, at 1277 (right of transit passage through straits); id. art. 90, at 1287 (right of
navigation on the high seas).
41 See, e.g., LOS Convention, supra note 37, arts. 156-185, at 1298-1306 (International
Sea-Bed Authority); id. arts. 186-191, at 1306-08 (Sea-Bed Disputes Tribunal). The Law of
the Sea Treaty provides for two international bodies to regulate activities in the deep sea-
bed: the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) and the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Id. arts. 156-191, at 1298-1308. One of the
proposed regulatory bodies, the ISA, is designed to "organize and control activities in the
[Vol. 58:306
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is possible that the law of the sea may be moving a step forward
because, unlike so much of international sea law in the past, these
developments promise not only international rules, but a system of
international organization for at least a part of the oceans.
It is possible that the International Sea-Bed Authority and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea will be added to the
list of those international organizations that are assuming some of
the real work of international government. More than just adding
to this list, the Sea-Bed organizations are special because they
would have the responsibility for what is defined in the Law of the
Sea Convention as international territory, the "common heritage of
mankind."42 This is a particularly bold assertion of international
law and organization, an assertion that upsets those who are fright-
ened of international organizations-for here are international in-
stitutions not only with the authority to make rules, but also with
the authority to actually rule over territory, hitherto the preserve
of nation-states.
It is, of course, these international ocean institutions that give
some of us in the United States problems. Sadly, there is an appar-
ent parallel between American actions respecting the international
ocean authority and those that the United States took 60 years ago
respecting the League of Nations. Then, it was an American Presi-
dent, Woodrow Wilson, who was the one person principally respon-
sible for the creation of the League.43 Yet, America, first in the
Area." Id. art. 157, at 1298. Toward this end, ISA has four main functions: researching and
developing the deep seabed; assisting the least developed nations to explore their offshore
resources; preserving the peace in the area; and conserving the marine environment. Mann-
Borgese, The Role of the Sea-Bed Authority in the '80s and '90s, in THEI MANAGE ENT OF
HumANTrY's RESOURCES: THE LAW OF THE SEA 35, 39-48 (L Dupuy ed. 1982). The other
international sea authority, the Sea-Bed Disputes Tribunal, will have jurisdiction over all
law of the sea matters along with other international tribunals. See Gaertner, The Dispute
Settlement Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea: Critique and Alternatives
to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 577, 582-83
(1982). For a critique of the international seabed dispute settlement provisions as found in
the treaty, see id. at 586-93.
, See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 136, at 1293. The common heritage concept
first was articulated in 1967 before the United Nations General Assembly by Ambassador
Arvid Pardo of Malta. Ambassador Pardo proposed that the mineral wealth of the oceans be
declared "the Common Heritage of Mankind." See Mann-Borgese, supra note 41, at 35.
This common heritage principle has been embraced by the developing world, see R. NA r,
LEGAL REGIME OF THE SEA-BED AND THE DEVELOPING CouNTiRIs 207-11 (1975), but the indus-
trialized countries have downplayed its significance, see Brown, Freedom of the High Seas
Versus the Common Heritage of Mankind. Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 521, 555-56 (1983).
"See D. BIrN, THE LEAGU OF NATIONS UNION 1918-1945, at 14 (1981); G. SMrrH,
1984]
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Senate, then as a nation, rejected the League for 20 years."" There
was a feeling here that the United States was better off on its own,
unentangled from the commitments and give-and-take of interna-
tional organizations. 45 Many persons recognize today that by tak-
ing no active part in the League of Nations and this attempt at
international problem-solving, the United States did too little to
brake the slide into the horrors of the Second World War.4" Ameri-
cans were especially resolved after the Second World War to do
better the next time and, thus, the United States took an active
part in the establishment of the United Nations.
47
How unfortunately comparable is our record with the law of
the sea. Four administrations-Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter
-Democratic and Republican, played an enormous part in the
molding of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and of its interna-
tional machinery for the resolution of disputes.4" Now, 15 years af-
ter the negotiations began, the United States has backed off,
bluntly insisting it will take only what it likes of the Treaty as
customary international law and leave the rest, especially the parts
concerning the international ocean authority.49 This seems remark-
ably shortsighted.
By taking such a position the United States not only fails to
live up to the expectations that it created during the time of treaty
WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED 56-57 (1964); R. STONE, THE IRRECONCILABLES 15 (1970).
" See E. BORCHARD & W. LAGE, NEUTRALITY FOR THE UNITED STATES 251 (1940); THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 37-38 (R. Henig ed. 1973); N. LEVIN, WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD
POLITICS 259-60 (1968). The rejection of the League of Nations by Americans is considered a
result of a combination of personal hostility to President Wilson, resentment against the
expanding power of the President's office, and reluctance to assume worldwide obligations
shortly after a world war. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra, at 37. See generally R. STONE,
supra note 43, at 183-88 (views of the leading Senators engaged in the fight against the
League of Nations).
'5 See THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 44, at 37; R. STONE, supra note 43, at 41-42.
" See Gross, The United States National Interest and the United Nations, in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 27 (F. Gross ed. 1964); THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
supra note 44, at 161, 168-69.
47 See R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 1 (1958); Strausz-Hup6,
Introduction, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 46, at 5.
48 See, e.g., A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 203-05 (1981)
(Johnson years); id. at 351-59 (Nixon and Ford years); id. at 359-70 (Carter years); see Sy-
nopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1981-82, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 679,
688-90 (1983).
4' See Ratiner, The Costs of American Rigidity, in LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DI-
LEMMA 27, 34-38 (Oxman, Carou & Buderi eds. 1983); Richardson, The United States Pos-
ture Toward the Law of the Sea Convention: Awkward but not Irreparable, 20 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 505, 505 (1983).
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drafting, but it also forfeits, as it had forfeited in the League of
Nations, the opportunity to participate in the international ma-
chinery set up by the Treaty. While others may debate the techni-
calities of the pros and cons of the deep seabed authority,50 it ap-
pears to me that the machinery is indeed adequate for American
national purposes. The United States' repudiation of the Treaty
was not, I think, based on any technical nicety. Rather, our repudi-
ation was based on a deeply held political belief that America is
better off going it alone, acting outside of international struc-
tures.51 Such an attitude smacks of dangerous unreality. While no
system of international law and international organization is good
for all time and for all problems, the international law and organi-
zation that is represented by and in the Law of the Sea Convention
is right for this time and these problems.
It must be remembered that this century, like Grotius' 17th
century, is too dangerous a period for any country to pretend that
it can go it alone and disavow international law and organization.
America's decision not to sign or ratify the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion hopefully will not take 25 years to reverse as it took us 25
years to reverse our decision repudiating the League of Nations. As
a great nation, the United States should play a part for, not
against, what remains of the international law of the sea. America
should play a part in the building of a new international law that is
good for humankind today and in the centuries that follow.
50 See, e.g., D. LErIZlanR & J. MUDGE, SEABED Mmmai. RESOURCES AND THE ECONOAnC
INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRmS 185-91 (1976) (alternative seabed mining regimes); Co-
hen, International Cooperation on Seabed Mining, in LAW OF THE SEA 101, 104-07 (1983)
(Reciprocating States' Agreements); Comment, The International Sea-Bed Authority Deci-
sion-Making Process: Does It Give a Proportionate Voice to the Participant's Interests in
Deep Sea Mining?, 20 SAN DIGo L. REv. 659, 660 (1983).
' See Goldwin, Common Sense vs. "The Common Heritage," in LAW OF THE SEA: U.S.
PoLIcy DMEMMA, supra note 49, at 59, 69-70; Ratiner, supra note 49, at 33; Richardson,
supra note 49, at 507-09.
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